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I. Introduction 
 The crisis that started in the summer of 2007 came as a surprise to many people.  
However, for others it was not a surprise.  John Paulson, the hedge fund manager, correctly 
predicted the subprime debacle and earned $3.7 billion in 2007 as a result.1  The 
vulnerabilities that the global financial system has displayed were hinted at beforehand in the 
Bank of England and other Financial Stability Reports.2  The Economist magazine had been 
predicting for some time that property prices in the US and a number of other countries were a 
bubble and were set to fall.3 
 Although the fall in US property prices that is the fundamental cause of the crisis was 
widely predicted, the effects that this had on financial institutions and markets were not.  In 
particular, what has perhaps been most surprising is the role that liquidity has played in the 
current crisis.  The purpose of this paper is to use insights from the academic literature on 
liquidity and crises to try to understand the role of liquidity during the last year.  We focus on 
four possible effects of liquidity: on pricing, on interbank and collateralized markets, on fear 
of contagion, and on the real economy.   
 One of the most puzzling features of the crisis has been the pricing of AAA tranches 
of a wide range of securitized products.  It appears that the market prices of many of these 
instruments are significantly below what plausible fundamentals would suggest they should 
be.  This pricing risk has come as a great surprise to many.  We argue that the sharp change in 
pricing regimes that started in August 2007 is consistent with what is known in the academic 
literature as “cash-in-the-market” pricing.  Holding liquidity is costly because less liquid 
assets usually have higher returns.  In order for providers of liquidity to markets to be 
compensated for this opportunity cost, they must on occasion be able to make a profit by 
buying up assets at prices below fundamentals.  Once the link between prices and 
                                                 
1 Financial Times, January 15, 2008 and June 18, 2008. 
2 See, for example, Bank of England (2006) and (2007). 
3 See, for example, Economist (2005) and (2006). 
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fundamentals is broken then arbitrage becomes risky and the usual forces that drive prices and 
fundamentals together no longer work.  This limit to arbitrage means that prices can deviate 
from fundamentals for protracted periods.   
 The second surprise has been the way in which the money markets have operated.  The 
interbank markets for terms longer than a few days have experienced considerable pressures.  
In addition, the way that the collateralized markets operate has changed significantly.  
Haircuts have increased and low quality collateral has become more difficult to borrow 
against.  The Federal Reserve and other central banks have introduced a wide range of 
measures to try to improve the smooth functioning of the money markets.  The extent to 
which these events affect the functioning of the financial system and justifies central bank 
intervention depends on the possible explanations as to why the markets stopped operating 
smoothly.  One of the main roles of interbank markets is to reallocate liquidity among banks 
that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks.  If banks hoard liquidity and as a result they are able 
to cover idiosyncratic shocks from their own liquidity holdings, then their unwillingness to 
lend to other banks is not a problem. If, on the contrary, the liquidity hoarding prevents the 
reshuffling of liquidity to deficient, but solvent banks, then the badly functioning interbank 
market is a problem warranting central bank liquidity provision. Allowing banks to exchange 
mortgage backed securities for Treasuries is desirable if it improves collateralized lending in 
the repo market but is not if it simply leads to more window dressing by financial institutions.  
In this case the actions of the Federal Reserve are simply removing market discipline. 
 The third aspect of the crisis that we consider relates to contagion risk. The 
controversial use of public funds in the arranged merger of Bear Stearns with J. P. Morgan 
was justified by the possibility of contagion.  If Bear Stearns had been allowed to fail, its 
extensive involvement as counterparty in many derivatives markets may have caused a string 
of defaults.  There is a large literature on the likelihood of contagion between banks based on 
simulations.  The conclusion of this literature is that contagion in banking is unlikely.  
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However, some have argued that these simulations do not capture important elements of the 
process.  Whatever one’s view of the likelihood of contagion in banking, it is important to 
conduct similar studies in the context of counterparty risk in derivatives and other markets. 
Much of the academic literature on the role of liquidity in financial crises has focused 
on the effects on the real economy, mainly through the provision of liquidity to non-financial 
firms.  We argue this has not been a significant factor to date in the current crisis.  However, 
this may change going forward. 
           There is a growing literature on understanding the current crisis.  Brunnermeier (2008) 
provides an excellent account of the sequence of events in the crisis focusing on a wide range 
of factors.  Adrian and Shin (2008) argue that the dynamics of the crisis are driven by 
deleveraging.  What sets our study apart from these papers is its primary focus on liquidity. 
 We start in Section II with a brief overview of the crisis focusing on the factors that 
are important for our subsequent discussion.  Section III considers what liquidity in our 
context actually is and how liquidity created by banks, which is the focus of our study, can be 
measured.  In Section IV we explain a theoretical framework for understanding liquidity 
provision.  Section V applies this framework to gain insights into the current crisis.  Finally, 
Section VI contains concluding remarks.    
 
II. Liquidity and the Crisis 
The crisis that started in the summer of 2007 is one of the most dramatic and important 
crises of recent decades. Its causes and unfolding have highlighted a number of new concerns 
and issues for policy makers, practitioners as well as academics interested in financial and 
monetary issues.  
In the following we briefly outline the sequence of events.  This provides a starting 
point for our discussion in subsequent sections. This description is mostly drawn from Federal 
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Reserve Bank (2008a, 2008b) (see also Bank of England, 2008; Bernanke, 2008; European 
Central Bank, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2007 and 2008; and Kohn, 2008).  
The crisis started in the first half of 2007 when the credit quality of subprime 
residential mortgages, in particular adjustable-rate ones, started to deteriorate. Mortgage 
companies specializing in subprime products experienced funding pressures and many failed. 
Although problems were initially confined to the subprime mortgage markets, further 
deterioration of credit quality and increases in the delinquency rates led to a spread of the 
crisis to other markets and products. By mid-2007 investors started to retreat from structured 
credit products and risky assets more generally, as rating agencies started downgrading many 
mortgage-backed securities. The securitization market for subprime mortgages simply broke 
down.  Figure 1 shows that in July 2007 there was a tremendous jump in the co-movement of 
AAA-rated tranches of subprime mortgage backed securities, commercial mortgage backed 
securities, and securities linked to corporate credit quality.  
A general loss of confidence started to become pervasive. Signs of strain appeared in 
the leveraged syndicated loan market and in other leveraged lending markets in late June 
2007, in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and in the term bank funding markets in 
August 2007.  Spreads of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) increased while the issuance 
of such debt reduced significantly, thus also reducing leveraged lending. Spreads on US 
ABCP widened significantly in mid August, while the volume of ABCP outstanding dropped 
significantly. This put substantial pressure on the structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that 
had heavily invested in structured financial products.  Many had to activate the contingent 
liquidity support from their sponsor banks.  
At the same time, problems arose in the term interbank funding markets in the US, 
Europe and the UK. Banks suddenly became much more unwilling to provide liquidity to 
other banks, especially for maturities longer than a few days. Reflecting that, Libor spreads 
rose significantly (Figure 2). The apparent reason for this liquidity hoarding was twofold. On 
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the one hand, banks wanted to protect themselves against potential larger-than-anticipated 
liquidity needs deriving from the disruptions in the mortgage, syndicated loans and 
commercial paper markets. On the other hand, uncertainty about the counterparty risk 
increased as banks could not precisely assess their counterparties’ exposure to the subprime 
related securities and also to the other disrupted markets.  
After a relief of the tensions in September and October following a 50 basis point 
reduction in the Federal Funds rate, tensions mounted again in November and December 
when end-of-the-year considerations became an additional element fueling the uncertainty 
deriving from the subprime market crisis. Spreads widened significantly again in all affected 
markets and a flight to quality led to a strong demand for safe assets and a sharp drop in 
Treasury bill yields.  
Problems mounted again in March 2008 when the release of news of further losses and 
write-downs due to the use of mark-to-market accounting increased concerns about the 
creditworthiness and the capital position of several institutions. Financial markets continued 
to be under great stress, particularly the markets for short-term uncollateralized and 
collateralized funding. Tensions culminated in mid-March 2008 when a sudden wholesale run 
on Bear Stearns impeded the investment bank obtaining funding on both unsecured and 
collateralized short term financing markets. Indicators of counterparty risk started being more 
significantly affected.  For example, the cost of insurance against the default of large complex 
financial institutions (LCFIs), as measured by the credit default swap spreads, rose steadily in 
2008 and reached an unprecedented peak around the time of the collapse of Bear Stearns 
(Figure 3).  
Central banks around the world accompanied the unfolding of the crisis with 
numerous interventions. Some of these interventions concerned reductions in policy rates (but 
the Fed also reduced the discount window rate in September 2007) as well as liquidity 
injections into the system. Other interventions concerned changes in the standard operational 
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frameworks or the creation of more unusual, innovative forms of special liquidity schemes. 
Changes involved extensions in the maturity of central bank lending (in the US both with 
respect to the discount window loans in September 2007 and the open market operations in 
March 2008), and widening of the collateral accepted. Special liquidity schemes introduced 
during the crisis include the Term Auction Facility in December 2007 through which credit is 
auctioned to depository institutions against Discount Window collateral, the Term Securities 
Lending Facility in March 2008 which allows primary dealers to swap less-liquid mortgage 
and other asset backed securities for Treasury securities, and, after the collapse of Bear 
Stearns, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility through which the discount window was extended 
to primary dealers. Similarly, a special liquidity scheme was introduced in the UK in April 
2008 according to which institutions eligible for the standing facilities can swap collateral 
with Treasury Bills. Furthermore, both the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve were 
directly involved in managing and orchestrating the rescue, respectively, of Northern Rock 
and Bear Stearns; and the Federal Reserve recently established a temporary arrangement to 
provide emergency liquidity to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, should it become necessary. 
More recently, the US Treasury has been given the power, though on a temporary basis, to 
extend unlimited credit to (and invest in the equity of) the two Government Sponsored 
Enterprises. 
Although the real effects of the crisis have so far been contained to some extent, initial 
signs of propagation seem to be emerging. Credit standards and terms on both commercial 
and industrial (C&I) loans and  commercial real estate loans tightened and the yields on 
corporate bonds increased significantly over the first half of 2008 (see Federal Reserve Bank 
2008, p. 12), indicating increasing pressures and risks for the nonfinancial corporate sector. 
Credit has remained available to the business sector so far, but household borrowing has 
slowed. Similar changes are occurring in the UK and Europe. The exchange rate of the dollar 
fluctuated during the crisis with a general trend towards depreciation against most currencies. 
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Private payroll employment started falling substantially in February 2008, and inflation 
started also to be a source of concern. Economic growth remained slow in the first half of 
2008, and the persistent weaknesses in the housing markets together with the tightened 
conditions for credit to businesses and households also weakened the projections for the 
second half of the year.  
 
III. Liquidity Provision by Banks 
 The term liquidity is used in many different ways.  For our purposes liquidity is the 
ability to buy financial assets and real goods and services immediately.  The most liquid asset 
is cash.  Current and deposit accounts and assets such as Treasury Bills are also very liquid.  
They can be sold to raise cash at short notice with very little fall in price. 
  How should the liquidity of the financial system be measured? The focus of our study 
is on financial institutions and in particular on banks.  Berger and Bouwman (2008a) have 
suggested a method for measuring liquidity created by the banking system and have applied it 
to the US.  They start by classifying all bank assets and liabilities together with off-balance 
sheet items as liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid.  They then assign weights to these three 
categories and calculate the amount of liquidity created by the banking system.  They consider 
several possible measures.  Their preferred measure includes off-balance sheet activities.  
According to this measure, in 2003 the US banking system created $2.843 trillion of liquidity.  
This represented 39% of gross total assets and 4.56 times the overall level of bank capital.  
The amount of liquidity created by the banking system increased every year between 1993 
and 2003 and during this period almost doubled.   
 In a subsequent paper Berger and Bouwman (2008b) use their measure of liquidity to 
investigate the relationship between liquidity and crises.  Their sample period from 1984-
2008Q1 includes two banking crises, the credit crunch of the early 1990’s and the current 
crisis.  They focus on “abnormal” liquidity creation.  This is defined to be the deviation from 
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the time trend of liquidity creation adjusted for seasonal factors.  They find that both banking 
crises in their sample have the feature that they were preceded by abnormal positive liquidity 
creation.  This was particularly true for the current crisis.  This reflects a build-up of capital 
and a loosening of lending standards.  During the credit crunch of the early 1990’s liquidity 
fell.  For the current crisis there is an indication of a fall after the start of the crisis but 
unfortunately, their data set only goes up to the end of 2007. 
 In order to understand the role of liquidity in the current financial crisis it is necessary 
to develop a theoretical framework for understanding liquidity creation by the banking system 
and how this relates to crises. 
 
IV. A Theoretical Framework of Liquidity Provision 
 Liquidity has clearly played a very important role in the current crisis. Therefore it is 
important to have a theoretical framework for thinking about liquidity provision by the 
banking system and its contribution to the occurrence of crises. What follows is not meant to 
be a literature review, but rather a very brief description of the relevant concepts related to the 
crisis using a few papers.  
 
Private Provision of Liquidity by the Financial System    
Asset pricing theory in financial economics that provides the tools for asset valuation 
and risk management relies on the assumptions of fully rational agents and perfect and 
complete markets. In these models agents understand the risks involved in the investments 
they undertake and price them correctly. In a similar spirit, much of the theory that underlies 
central bank inflation-target policy in recent years relies on similar assumptions. In this 
frictionless world financial institutions have no role to play, and financial crises should never 
occur. However, they do occur, and as the current crisis shows, badly functioning money 
markets, financial institutions and their role as liquidity creators can be at center stage.  
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Understanding recent events in terms of models without financial intermediaries is difficult, to 
say the least. 
 The first step in analyzing the role of liquidity in financial crises is to develop a model 
of liquidity provision in the context of financial institutions and markets.  We need to 
understand how a financial system can provide liquidity efficiently and what can go wrong.  
We also need to consider the potential role of central banks in improving the allocation of 
resources and maintaining financial stability when there is a problem. 
The standard model of banking that allows consideration of the role of banks as 
liquidity providers was introduced by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983).  There 
is a short asset that provides liquidity in the next period and a long asset that provides a higher 
return but at a later date.  Consumers are initially unsure when they will require liquidity and 
they cannot directly insure this risk.  In this view of the world the role of banks is to provide 
liquidity insurance to depositors. 
The original banking models do not include financial markets.  To understand the 
current crisis, it is essential to have a framework with both financial intermediaries and 
markets.  Allen and Gale (2004a, 2007), among others, develop such an approach.  They 
argue that in modern financial systems financial markets are essential for financial 
institutions.  Consumers invest in financial intermediaries such as banks and mutual funds and 
these institutions then invest in financial markets.  Information and transaction costs make it 
too costly for individual investors to trade directly in the full range of financial markets.  Both 
financial intermediaries and markets play an important role in this environment.  Financial 
intermediaries provide liquidity insurance to consumers against their individual liquidity 
shocks.  Markets allow financial intermediaries (and hence their depositors) to share 
aggregate risks.  This general equilibrium framework allows a normative analysis of liquidity 
provision by the financial system.  It is like the Arrow-Debreu model of resource allocation 
but includes financial institutions.  It provides a benchmark for the efficient provision of 
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liquidity by intermediaries and markets and an ideal allocation for a central bank to aim at 
implementing.  
Banks allow consumers to deposit funds that they can withdraw when they have 
liquidity needs.  This liquidity provision allows banks to accumulate funds that they can use 
to lend to firms to fund long term investments.  Banks must manage their liquidity so that they 
can meet the liquidity needs of their depositors.  There are two types of uncertainty 
concerning liquidity needs.  The first is that each individual bank is faced with idiosyncratic 
liquidity risk.  At any given date its customers may have more or less liquidity needs.  The 
second type of uncertainty that banks face is aggregate liquidity risk.  In some periods 
aggregate liquidity demand is high while in other periods it is low. Thus, aggregate risk 
exposes all banks to the same shock, by increasing or decreasing the demand for liquidity that 
all banks face at the same time. The ability of banks to hedge themselves against these 
liquidity risks crucially depend on the functioning, or, more precisely, the completeness of 
financial markets. 
If financial markets are complete, the financial system provides liquidity efficiently in 
that it ensures that banks’ liquidity shocks are hedged. One way to implement complete 
markets that allow every bank to hedge itself against idiosyncratic liquidity risk is as follows. 
Each bank issues a small amount of a security contingent on the idiosyncratic liquidity shock 
experienced by each other bank.  With the funds generated by these securities, each bank buys 
all of the securities issued by the other banks that are contingent on its own idiosyncratic 
shock.  Thus when a bank is hit by a high liquidity shock, it obtains the funds it needs to cover 
its liquidity requirements.4  
The equilibrium prices of all these bank-specific securities together with securities that 
allow aggregate risk to be hedged lead to the efficient provision of liquidity by the financial 
system.  The invisible hand of the market ensures that the pricing of the complete set of 
                                                 
4 See Allen, Carletti and Gale (2008) for a full description of how complete markets can be implemented. 
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securities provides the correct incentives for the provision of liquidity by the banking system 
in every state of the world.  
The key point here is that the implementation of complete markets requires a large 
number of bank-specific securities, but in practice we do not see anything that resembles this 
kind of situation or provides an equivalent allocation. One possible reason is that the 
infrastructure needed to support all the securities required for markets to be complete can be 
very costly in practice and thus not convenient. Although the current US financial system has 
many securities and many are specifically contingent on the particular experiences of specific 
firms such as credit default swaps, it is still a far cry from enabling the type of hedging 
transactions that correspond to the theoretical benchmark of complete markets. 
If markets are incomplete, banks can trade only a limited number of assets and their 
ability to hedge liquidity risk changes dramatically. The incompleteness of markets leads to 
inefficient provision of liquidity by the financial system. This can generate cash-in-the-market 
pricing, where even the prices of safe assets can fall below their fundamental value, and lead 
to financial fragility, where even small shocks have large effects on asset prices. In addition, 
there can be contagion where shocks spread from one institution to another leading to a chain 
of bankruptcies.  These effects provide an explanation of what can go wrong in imperfect 
financial markets. 
  
Financial Fragility and Cash-in-the-Market Pricing 
 The problem with incomplete markets is that liquidity provision by the financial 
system is inefficient.  The nature of risk management to ensure that the bank or intermediary 
has the correct amount of liquidity changes significantly from the case of complete markets.  
When markets are complete it is possible, as explained above, to use securities to ensure 
liquidity is received in the situations when it is needed.  The price system ensures adequate 
liquidity is provided in every state and is priced properly state by state.  In this case banks and 
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other intermediaries buy liquidity in states where it is scarce by selling liquidity in states 
where it is plentiful for them, and the financial system allows risk sharing and insurance.   
In contrast when markets are incomplete, liquidity provision is achieved by selling 
assets when liquidity is required.  When liquidity is scarce asset prices are determined by the 
available liquidity or in other words by the cash in the market.  It is necessary that a 
proportion of financial institutions hold extra liquidity that allows them to buy up assets when 
liquidity is scarce.  These suppliers of liquidity are no longer compensated for the cost of 
providing liquidity state by state.  Instead the cost must be made up on average across all 
states and this is where the problem lies.   
The providers of liquidity have the alternative of investing in a productive long asset.  
There is an opportunity cost to holding liquidity since this has a lower return than the 
productive long asset.  In order for agents to be willing to supply liquidity they must be able 
to make a profit in some states.  If nobody held liquidity, the price of the long asset would 
collapse to zero. This would provide an incentive for some agents to hold liquidity since they 
can acquire assets cheaply. But if the price increased too much, then nobody would hold 
liquidity as this would not make any profit. Thus, in equilibrium prices will be bid to the level 
where the profit in the states where banks face high liquidity demand is sufficient to 
compensate the providers of liquidity for all the other states where they do not make any 
profit and simply bear the opportunity cost of holding liquidity. In other words, prices are low 
in the states where banks need more liquidity.  But this is exactly the wrong time from an 
efficiency point of view for there to be a transfer from the banks who need liquidity to the 
providers of liquidity. There is in effect negative insurance and suboptimal risk sharing. Asset 
price volatility is costly because depositors are risk averse and their consumption varies across 
banks with high and low idiosyncratic liquidity risk.5 This leaves scope for central bank 
intervention. By engaging in open market operations to fix the price of the long asset (or 
                                                 
5 Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008a) analyze in detail how this pricing mechanism works. 
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equivalently fix the short term interest rate), central banks can remove the inefficiency 
deriving from the asset price volatility and achieve the same allocation as with complete 
markets (Allen, Carletti and Gale, 2008). 
To summarize, when markets are incomplete asset prices must be volatile to provide 
incentives for liquidity provision.  This asset price volatility can lead to costly and inefficient 
crises.  There is a market failure that provides the justification for central bank and other kinds 
of intervention to improve the allocation of resources.  Liquidity provision in the complete 
markets allocation provides a benchmark for judging the effectiveness of such intervention.   
  
Contagion 
A second important concept when markets are incomplete is contagion.  The linkages 
between banks that interbank markets provide imply that problems in one bank can spread to 
other banks and can potentially disrupt the whole financial system.  Allen and Gale (2000) 
analyze a variant of the basic model of liquidity provision described above to consider how 
this process works and the inefficiencies involved.6  As with financial fragility, the problem is 
concerned with liquidity provision but in a somewhat different way.  The possibility of 
contagion arises from the overlapping claims that different banks have on one another rather 
than from asset price volatility. When one bank suffers a shock and defaults as a consequence, 
the other banks suffer a loss because their claims on the troubled bank fall in value. If this 
spillover effect is strong enough, it can cause a crisis throughout the system. In extreme cases, 
the crisis passes from bank to bank, eventually having an impact on a much larger set of 
banks than the one in which the original shock occurred. 
If there is a large degree of interconnectedness between banks in the sense that many 
hold the assets of others, there are many links through which a crisis can spread.  On the other 
hand, the importance of each link will be smaller.  This means that a shock can be more easily 
                                                 
6 For a survey of the literature on contagion see Allen and Babus (2008). 
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absorbed by the capital buffer of each institution.  If there are a few links but each involves a 
larger amount of funds, crises are more likely to spread because each bank’s capital buffer 
will be overwhelmed if another bank fails.  Thus the case of some interconnectedness but not 
too much represents the most likely situation for contagion to occur. 
Contagion is an extremely worrying phenomenon for policy makers.  The costs of 
bankruptcy of financial institutions can be large.  A whole string of bankruptcies among banks 
can cause tremendous damage to the financial system, and this in turn has the potential to 
have large spillovers to the real economy.  If firms no longer have access to funding from 
banks or other financial institutions then they may have to cut investment and their level of 
output significantly. 
Many factors affect the probability and the extent of contagion. One that seems to 
have played a role in the current crisis relates to the use of mark-to-market accounting. This 
accounting method has the benefit of reflecting the market value of the balance sheets of 
financial institutions and therefore of allowing regulators, investors and other users of 
accounting information to better assess the risk profile of financial institutions. This is true 
provided financial markets operate perfectly and prices correctly reflect the future earning 
power of assets.  However, when markets do not work perfectly and prices do not always 
reflect the value of fundamentals as in the case where there is cash-in-the-market pricing, 
mark-to-market accounting exposes the value of the balance sheets of financial institutions to 
short-term and excessive fluctuations, and it can ultimately generate contagion. If there is 
cash-in-the-market pricing in one sector of the financial system, then other sectors can be 
affected by the change in the prices and may be forced to write down the value of their 
assets.7 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Allen and Carletti (2008a) for an analysis of mark to market accounting when there is cash-in-the-market 
pricing.  
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Asymmetric Information 
 In our discussion of liquidity provision so far, asymmetric information has played a 
relatively small role.  In particular, the assets that are traded are not characterized by 
asymmetric information.  In the current crisis many people believe that asymmetric 
information has played an important role (see, for example, Gorton, 2008).  Bolton, Santos 
and Scheinkman (2008) have provided an interesting theory of liquidity provision with 
asymmetric information. 
 In their model there are three sets of agents.  These are investors with a short horizon, 
intermediaries and investors with a long horizon.  The basic source of inefficiency is 
asymmetric information about asset values between long-horizon investors and financial 
intermediaries.  Long-horizon investors cannot distinguish between an asset sale that is due to 
a liquidity need and an asset sale to offload low quality securities.  This asymmetric 
information leads to an adverse selection problem and consequently to a price discount.  
Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman assume that as time passes, the intermediaries learn more 
about the assets that they hold.  This ensures that over time the adverse selection problem gets 
worse, and the price discount if an intermediary sells becomes greater.   
The basic problem an intermediary faces if it is hit by a liquidity shock is whether to 
sell its assets now at a discount or to try and ride out the crisis.  The danger of doing this is 
that the intermediary runs the risk of having to sell at a greater discount if the crisis lasts 
longer than expected.  It is shown that two types of rational expectations equilibrium exist.  In 
what they call the immediate trading equilibrium, intermediaries sell assets immediately to 
ensure they have enough liquidity.  In the delayed trading equilibrium intermediaries try to 
ride out the crisis and only sell if they are forced to. 
For some parameter values only the immediate trading equilibrium exists while for 
others both do.  Surprisingly, the authors are able to show that the delayed trading equilibrium 
is Pareto superior when both exist.  The reason is that short-horizon investors undervalue long 
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assets while long-horizon investors undervalue cash.  There is a gain from inducing short-
horizon investors to hold more long assets and long-horizon investors more cash.  This is 
what the delayed trading equilibrium does.   The worse is the asymmetric information 
problem the less is the gain as it impedes the operation of the market for the long assets.   
 
Spillovers to the Real Economy 
 Much of the literature on liquidity provision has been concerned with the provision of 
liquidity to firms and resulting spillovers to the real economy.  One of the important issues in 
crises is why problems in the financial system spill over into the real economy.  The seminal 
contribution here is Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).  In their model entrepreneurs operate firms.  
These entrepreneurs need to provide costly effort for the firm to be successful.  In order to 
ensure they are willing to do this, they need to be provided with part of the equity of the firm.  
This limits the ability of the firm to raise funds by issuing securities to outside investors.  If a 
firm is hit by a liquidity shock and needs more funds to continue, it may be unable to raise 
them in the market.  If it cannot continue because of this, then it may go bankrupt and this can 
cause a significant loss in welfare. The occurrence of this event is more likely when credit 
markets are disrupted. In order to overcome this problem, the firm may need to hold liquid 
securities that it can sell in the event of a liquidity shock.  If the private supply of such 
securities is insufficient, the government may be able to improve welfare by issuing 
government debt that can be held by firms.  Now when firms are hit by a shock they will have 
sufficient liquidity to continue.      
 Another important contribution is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).  They show that small 
shocks can lead to large effects because of the role of collateral.  A shock that lowers asset 
prices lowers the value of collateral.  This means that less borrowing is possible, asset prices 
are further lowered and so on in a downward spiral.  Disruptions in liquidity provision can be 
the shock that initially lowers asset prices and starts the problem. 
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V. Insights into the Current Crisis 
 In this section we focus on four of the crucial features of the crisis that we argue are 
related to liquidity provision.  The first is the fall of the prices of AAA-rated tranches of 
securitized products below fundamental values.  The second is the effect of the crisis on the 
interbank markets for term funding and on collateralized money markets.  The third is fear of 
contagion should a major institution fail.  Finally, we consider the effects on the real 
economy.  
 
1. Effects of liquidity on pricing 
 One of the most surprising aspects of the crisis has been the collapse in prices of even 
the AAA-rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities and other structured credit products.  
Some banks have had to write down the AAA-rated super senior tranches of mortgage-linked 
collateralized debt obligations by as much as 30 percent (Tett 2008) due to a fall in their 
market prices.  According to the Bank of England (2008, pp. 18-21) if this change in price 
was due to deterioration in fundamentals, then it would be necessary to believe that the 
ultimate percentage loss rate of securitized subprime mortgages would be 38 percent. This 
would be justified, if, for example, 76% of households with subprime securitized mortgages 
would default and the loss given default rate was 50%.  This seems, however, implausible 
given that none of the AAA-rated tranches have yet defaulted and, as the Bank of England 
also estimated, there should not be any future default in AAA-rated subprime mortgage-
backed securities, even with a continued decline in US house prices.   
It is not only AAA-rated tranches of subprime mortgage-backed instruments that have 
suffered but also commercial mortgage-backed securities and securitizations linked to 
corporate credit quality.  As Figure 1 illustrates, at the start of the crisis the comovement of 
these instruments rose dramatically.  The high co-movement among different types of AAA-
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rated securities with different fundamentals suggests that it is probably not fundamentals 
driving the falls in prices.     
 The framework developed in the previous section provides some insight into what 
could be determining prices.  The movements observed are consistent with the cash-in-the 
market pricing of securities explained above.  In this framework it can be shown that 
aggregate shortages of liquidity can cause even risk free securities to trade at a significant 
discount to their fundamental.  Usually the theory is developed in terms of a single asset.  
However, the analysis can be applied to the case of multiple assets.  With segmented markets 
the theory can also explain why different but related types of security would also be affected 
so their prices would tend to fall as well.  
 Participating in a market involves the initial fixed cost of finding out information 
about the security being trade.  This fixed cost limits the number of participants. The structure 
of investment banks and other participants in markets is usually such that a desk will trade a 
number of related products to try to economize on this fixed cost.  Risk management in these 
firms is such that in the short run there is a fixed limit on the total amount of cash available to 
purchase these securities.  Our view is that as news about the subprime default problems came 
out, many investors changed their estimate of the risk of these securities and readjusted their 
portfolios.  This led to a wave of selling and overwhelmed the capacity of the market to 
absorb sales.  As a result prices of even the AAA-tranches fell.  The reason that the prices of 
other securities such as AAA-rated tranches of commercial mortgage backed securities also 
fell is that they are traded by the same desks as securitized subprime products and so sales of 
these also led to a drop in prices.    
 One important feature of this pricing of AAA-rated tranches at such large discounts is 
their persistence.  One might expect cash-in-the market prices to persist for a few days.  But 
once the limits on each desk’s ability to trade have had time to be adjusted it would be natural 
to expect the desks to bid up the prices of the securities since there would appear to be a 
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significant arbitrage opportunity.  By going short in similar maturity Treasuries and investing 
in these AAA-rated tranches a significant premium could apparently be earned.  What 
prevents this?  The answer is limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  In particular, 
once the link between prices and fundamentals is broken, the difference between them may 
widen in the wrong direction during the period of holding the position.   
It is well known that such limits to arbitrage can prevent even virtually identical 
securities from trading at the same price.  The classic example is the shares of the Dutch 
company Royal Dutch Petroleum and the British company Shell Transport and Trading.  
Before July of 2005 when the two entities were formally merged into a single company, the 
shares of Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading were Siamese twins that 
shared in the profits of the oil major.  Royal Dutch received 60% of the dividends and 
earnings of the joint company and Shell Transport and Trading received the remaining 40%.  
Standard asset pricing theory suggests they should have traded at a ratio of 60/40 = 1.5.  In 
fact they traded at very different price ratios than this (see, for example, Brealey, Myers and 
Allen 2008, p. 367). 
 It is interesting to note that although the prices of AAA-rated tranches of non-
subprime mortgage backed securities such as commercial mortgage-backed and 
securitizations linked to corporate credit quality were significantly affected, the prices of 
conforming prime mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
much less affected.  This is not surprising given that here the arbitrage is virtually risk free 
given the implicit government guarantee provided to the securities of these government-
sponsored enterprises. 
 Once the value of AAA-rated tranches of securitized products fell significantly, it no 
longer became possible to fund the Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and similar entities 
holding them using short term finance.  Thus the market for asset-backed commercial paper to 
finance such SIVs dried up since it was now clear the collateral was lower in value and also 
 20
risky whereas before it was thought to be safe.  To avoid loss of reputation, the banks that had 
set up these SIVs were forced to bring the underlying assets back on to their balance sheets.  
Their need for liquidity was thus dramatically increased.             
 In our view, one of the important features of the current crisis is therefore that cash-in-
the-market pricing combined with limits to arbitrage has significantly affected the pricing of 
large volumes of fixed income securities for significant periods of time.  Effectively this 
means that the creation by banks of uninsured off-balance sheet vehicles that borrow short 
and invest long has significantly increased risk in the financial system.  Moreover, until 
significant experience has been gained concerning this type of risk of the cash-in-the-market 
pricing of such assets, the ability of financial institutions to manage risk exposures will be 
considerably impaired.  
 Another possible explanation of the pricing anomalies in the AAA-rated tranches of 
securitized securities is that they are due to asymmetric information as, for example, in 
Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2008). Strong adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
provide a potential explanation for the large discounts in prices for risky securities like those 
backed by subprime mortgages. However, the fall of other AAA-rated securities as well as the 
co-movements of prices of these products as shown in Figure 1 are more difficult to explain.  
The deterioration in the fundamentals of the underlying instruments in commercial mortgage 
backed securitizations and securitizations linked to corporate credit quality, was much less.  
Some other factor must be at work for the asymmetric information to be consistent with what 
happened.  
 
The Effects on Interbank Markets and Collateralized Markets 
 The second feature of the current crisis that has caused some surprise is the effect on 
the money markets.  In particular, volumes in the interbank markets for maturities beyond a 
few days were significantly reduced.  Less surprisingly, in the collateralized money markets, 
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the haircuts on collateral increased significantly particularly for mortgage-backed securities as 
shown in Table 1.  We consider each of these in turn. 
One of the important issues with the interbank markets is the cause of the increase in 
spreads shown in Figure 2.  These strains were particularly severe in December of 2007 and 
led the Fed to introduce special measures to provide liquidity, including the introduction of 
the Term Auction Facility to lend against Discount Window collateral.  Subsequently in 
March 2008, they lengthened the term they were willing to lend for in open market 
operations, introduced the Term Securities Lending Facilities to lend Treasuries against a 
broad range of collateral, and announced the Primary Dealer Credit Facility to lend bilaterally 
to primary dealers.    
An important question is why these strains occurred and whether the actions of the 
Federal Reserve were warranted.  As mentioned in Section II, two explanations are typically 
given as to why the interbank markets came under such strain.  The first is that banks were 
hoarding liquidity in anticipation that they would have significant liquidity needs going 
forward.  For example, they faced the possibility of having to bring many assets in SIVs and 
other off-balance sheet entities back on balance sheet as asset backed commercial paper 
markets dried up.  Also, banks faced the prospect as the economy slowed down of 
corporations drawing down their lines of credit.  All in all, liquidity had become scarce and 
the prospect of uncertainty in aggregate demand for liquidity going forward meant banks 
wanted to hold onto as much as possible.8  
The second explanation for the drying up of interbank markets is that increased 
uncertainty about the solvency of banks meant that they became unwilling to lend to each 
other.  It is argued that uncertainty over which banks held subprime mortgages and the value 
of these, together with the uncertainty concerning other securitized assets, made it very 
difficult for banks to judge which banks they should lend to.  If this is the explanation of the 
                                                 
8 See Allen, Carletti and Gale (2008) for an analysis of the relationship between aggregate liquidity risk and 
liquidity hoarding.   
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drying up of markets, then one would expect to see distrust of banks’ prospects going forward 
to be reflected in the pricing of credit default swaps on banks.  It can be seen from Figure 3 
that the spread on credit default swaps on banks were elevated in December 2007 but by a 
relatively small amount.  This was much less than the spreads that occurred in March 2008 at 
the time that Bear Stearns collapsed.  The relatively low spreads in December 2007 suggest 
that banks reluctance to lend to each other probably plays a relatively small part in explaining 
why markets dried up.  Liquidity hoarding is probably a more important factor. 
If liquidity hoarding is the explanation, then the drying up of interbank markets may in 
fact not be a problem.  It can be argued that the main role of interbank markets is to reallocate 
liquidity between banks to allow them to meet idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.  If there is 
increased aggregate uncertainty about liquidity demand, banks will hold more liquidity and 
can then cover idiosyncratic demands without resorting to the interbank market.  In this case 
the drying up of liquidity does not pose a threat to financial stability.  In contrast, if the 
unwillingness of banks to provide liquidity prevents the efficient reallocation of liquidity to 
banks in need of liquidity, then financial stability can be affected and central bank 
intervention is warranted. 
We next turn to the collateralized money markets.  Much of the lending that occurs 
between financial institutions takes the form of short term collateralized repurchase 
agreements.  In normal times a wide range of assets from Treasuries to mortgage-backed 
securities are used as collateral and they are regarded as close substitutes.  Haircuts vary but 
by relatively small amounts. Table 1 shows that this changed as the current crisis progressed.  
This is partly because of the valuation issues discussed in the previous section that makes the 
securities more risky as collateral.  In addition there is the issue that if there is a default, 
particularly of a major financial institution, there is likely to be a flight to quality. This should 
increase the value of Treasuries but reduce the value of lower quality collateral such as 
mortgage-backed securities.  In extreme circumstances, the flight to quality may cause the 
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value of the lower quality collateral to fall below the haircut the lender took.  Thus Treasuries 
become a preferred form of collateral in times of crisis.  In this view, the actions of the 
Federal Reserve and other central banks in making Treasuries more available by swapping 
them for lower quality collateral significantly helps the functioning of the repo markets.    
One of the interesting characteristics of the strains in the interbank markets is that they 
were most severe in December of 2007 and around quarter’s end in September 2007 and 
March 2008.  This suggests that other considerations such as the desire of financial 
institutions to window dress may have also contributed to the strains.  Musto (1997, 1999) 
presents persuasive evidence that financial institutions’ desire to look good at year’s end and 
the end of quarters leads to significant pricing effects in the money markets. Such desire may 
have been even more accentuated during the recent crisis. In this case the actions of the 
Federal Reserve in exchanging Treasuries for mortgage backed securities and lower quality 
collateral may actually hurt rather than help.  Financial institutions can hold low quality 
securities for the period where no reporting is required.  They then briefly buy Treasuries so 
that the balance sheet they report to shareholders or regulators is high quality.  Temporarily 
increasing the supply of Treasuries makes this kind of deception easier.  It helps remove 
market and regulator discipline. 
An important issue is the extent to which the strains in the market and the increased 
appetite for Treasuries occurred because of a need for improved collateral or because of a 
desire to window dress.  More research is needed to settle this issue and evaluate the 
desirability of the actions undertaken by the Federal Reserve and other central banks.  One 
piece of information that would shed some light on the importance of these two factors is the 
extent to which low quality collateral was swapped for Treasuries and the extent to which 
these transactions were reversed afterwards. 
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3. Fear of Contagion 
The justification that the Federal Reserve gave for arranging the takeover of Bear 
Stearns by J. P. Morgan was the fear of contagion [Minutes of the Federal Reserve, March 14, 
2008].  Bear Stearns was the counterparty in a large number of derivative transactions.  The 
fear was that if they had gone bankrupt there would have been contagion through the network 
of derivative contracts that they were part of and a large number of other financial institutions 
may have been adversely affected.   
Contagion was discussed above in Section IV.  Theories of contagion have mostly 
been developed in the context of banks and interbank markets.  They show how a shock to 
one bank that causes bankruptcy can cascade through the financial system and cause a string 
of bankruptcies.  If bankruptcy costs are high, then this string of failures can be very costly.  
The effect on asset prices may be large if failed institutions are forced to liquidate assets and 
there is cash-in-the market pricing.  Moreover, there may be significant spillovers into the real 
economy if a significant number of financial institutions fail.  Contagion potentially provides 
a strong justification for central banks to intervene and save institutions such as Bear Stearns.  
The key issue is how likely this kind of damaging contagion is in practice. This depends on 
the number and size of counterparties active in the market as well as on the size of the 
interrelations among them. The more numerous are the counterparties and the smaller the 
interrelations, the less likely it is that a default of one counterparty leads to contagion. The 
reason is that the buffers of capital of the surviving intermediaries are more likely to be large 
enough to absorb the default, especially if each of them has only small claims with the 
troubled intermediary. Given the characteristics of the markets where Bear Stearns operated, 
it is quite possible that this would have been the case and no contagion would have occurred.  
Upper (2007) provides a survey of simulation exercises that look for evidence of 
contagious failures of financial institutions resulting from the mutual claims they have on one 
another. Most of these papers use balance sheet information to estimate bilateral credit 
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relationships for different banking systems. The stability of the interbank market is tested by 
simulating the breakdown of a single bank. This methodology has been applied to the 
Belgian, German, Swiss, UK and US  banking systems among others. These papers find that 
the banking systems demonstrate a high resilience, even to large shocks. Simulations of the 
worst case scenarios show that banks representing less than 5% of total balance sheet assets 
would be affected by contagion on the Belgian interbank market, while for the German 
system the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15% of the banking 
sector in terms of assets. These results heavily depend on how the linkages between banks, 
represented by credit exposures in the interbank market, are estimated. For most countries, 
data is extracted from banks' balance sheets, which can provide information on the aggregate 
exposure of the reporting institution vis-à-vis all other banks. To estimate bank-to-bank 
exposures, it is generally assumed that banks spread their lending as evenly as possible. In 
effect, this assumption requires that banks are connected in a complete network. Hence the 
assumption might bias the results, in the light of the theoretical findings that better connected 
networks are more resilient to the propagation of shocks.  
    The main finding of this literature is that contagion is unlikely.  However, there are 
a number of reasons for caution in accepting this result and concluding that policymakers 
need not worry about contagion between banks.  The first is that they do not model price 
effects of bankruptcy.  Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2004) have argued that these price 
effects are the main transmission mechanism for contagion.  As Upper (2007) points out, they 
also rely on the initial shock being confined to a single bank.  If there is an initial shock that 
affects several banks simultaneously, then this can also lead to contagion being more likely. 
In the case of Bear Stearns it is not clear from publicly available information how 
much contagion there would have been had it been allowed to fail.  Press reports stress the 
large number of derivative contracts that Bear Stearns was a counterpart in.  However, as 
argued above, this could mean that contagion was less likely because there would be more 
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institutions with capital buffers to absorb the defaults.  In any case, more simulations like 
those undertaken for banks are needed in the context of derivatives to assess the likelihood of 
contagion with this kind of default.  
As a final point, one also has to keep in mind that even when there is a realistic risk of 
contagion that justifies central bank or government intervention, this also involves costs that 
should be traded-off against the costs deriving from contagion. These costs of intervention 
include the future moral hazard associated with increased risk taking by financial institutions 
going forward. 
 
4. Effects on the Real Economy 
 As discussed in Section IV, much of the academic literature on liquidity has been 
concerned with firm’s access to funds.  If firms are limited in the amount they can raise 
because of factors such as moral hazard and adverse selection, they may be limited in the 
amount they can invest or may even fail if they suffer a liquidity shock.  By holding liquid 
assets they can avoid this problem. 
 So far the indications outlined in Section II indicate that firms’ financing has not been 
affected too much and in particular firms have not had to greatly restrict their investment 
plans because of a lack of finance.  However, credit standards and terms on corporate and real 
estate loans have tightened.  In the first half of 2008 yields on corporate bonds also increased 
significantly.  If the crisis continues to worsen, the effects on corporate finance discussed in 
the literature may begin to bite more seriously. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The fundamental cause of the current crisis has been the dramatic fall in property 
prices.  Although this fall in property prices was widely anticipated, many aspects of the crisis 
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that resulted were not and these have considerably exacerbated the effects of the crisis.  We 
have focused on three of the most important. These are the following. 
 The significant fall in prices of many AAA-rated tranches of securitized products 
including many unrelated to subprime mortgages. 
 The drying up of interbank markets for maturities beyond a few days and the change 
in haircuts on collateralized lending. 
 The fear of contagion. 
We have argued that these phenomena are all intimately connected with the role of liquidity in 
financial crises.  They have greatly exacerbated the effects of the crisis. 
 We suggest that the significant discounts on AAA-rated tranches of securitized 
products that are too large to be explained by the underlying fundamentals are the result of 
cash-in-the-market pricing.  These price movements were unanticipated and have produced a 
whole set of problems for risk management going forward. 
 The drying up of liquidity in interbank markets is usually attributed to a mixture of 
liquidity hoarding by banks to counter the increased uncertainty over aggregate liquidity 
demand and fear of lending to other banks.  At the end of 2007 the evidence seems to be that 
banks were to a large extent hoarding liquidity rather than refusing to lend to too counterparts 
because credit default swaps on banks were only elevated somewhat.  This is less of a 
problem than fear of lending as banks are not being refused credit.     
In normal times high quality asset backed securities and Treasuries are close 
substitutes for collateral in the money markets.  However, in crisis times they are not because 
the possibility of default will cause a flight to quality.  This leads to a demand for Treasuries 
rather than asset backed securities.  It is desirable for central banks to meet this demand to 
improve the efficiency of the money markets.  However, in times of stress there is also a 
heightened demand for Treasuries for window dressing purposes at quarter and year end.  
Meeting this increased demand for Treasuries is not desirable as it removes an important 
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market discipline.  It is important that current facilities that allow asset backed securities to be 
swapped for Treasuries be evaluated in this light. 
Theoretical analysis suggests that the process of contagion where default cascades 
through the financial system represents a significant danger.  Contagion was the justification 
for preventing the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns as they were heavily involved as counterparties 
in the derivatives markets.  However, little empirical work on the plausibility of contagion in 
the context of derivatives markets has been done.  This is urgently needed.  
In the remainder of this section, we consider some open issues related to the role of 
liquidity in financial crises that deserve attention.  The first concerns mark-to-market 
accounting.  One of the points we have emphasized is that cash-in-the-market pricing leads to 
prices that do not reflect fundamentals. If that occurs, mark-to-market accounting for financial 
institutions has the disadvantage that it can understate the value of banks and other 
intermediaries and makes them appear insolvent when in fact they are not.  Historic cost 
accounting has the advantage that it does not do this.  On the other hand, it leads to bankrupt 
institutions that deserve to be closed being able to continue and possibly gamble for 
resurrection.  In Allen and Carletti (2008b) we suggest that in financial crisis situations where 
liquidity is scarce and prices are low as a result, market prices should be supplemented with 
both model-based and historic cost valuations.  The rest of the time and in particular when 
asset prices are low because expectations of future cash flows have fallen, mark-to-market 
accounting should instead be used.   
The second issue is the “too big to save problem” of large banks in small countries.  
The Federal Reserve could easily prevent the threat of contagion posed by Bear Stearns.  
Even the threat of contagion posed by the failure of the largest banks in the US such as 
Citigroup and Bank of America could be avoided by central bank and government 
intervention even though this may require the outlay of very large amounts of government 
funds.  However, some banks are so large relative to the countries in which they are based that 
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this is not the case.  One example is Fortis in Belgium.  This has assets that are greater in size 
than the GDP of Belgium.  If it were to fail it would be quite likely that a Belgian government 
(if one existed at the time) would be unwilling to intervene and assume fiscal responsibility 
because of the large size of the burden.  In this case the key issue would be how the burden 
would be shared between countries of the European Union.  Ecofin (2008, p. 5) specifies that 
“If public resources are involved, direct budgetary net costs are shared among affected 
Member States on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria,…”  Unfortunately, this lack of 
specificity is likely to lead to substantial delays in dealing with the situation as each country 
vies to improve its fiscal position.  During this time the prospect of contagion could 
effectively freeze many European and some global capital markets with enormous effects on 
the real economy.  It is an urgent matter for the European Union to agree on specific ex ante 
burden sharing criteria for the costs of preventing large banking crises. The work along these 
lines that is currently under way needs to proceed rapidly.        
Even more worrying is the fact that there exist banks that may fail in small countries 
that are not part of a larger grouping.  The classic example here is UBS and Credit Suisse in 
Switzerland.  These two banks both have assets significantly in excess of Swiss GDP.  It may 
literally be infeasible for the Swiss government to raise the funds to prevent their failure.  In 
such cases the potential damage caused by the prospect of contagion if one of them were to 
fail is very large.  It is again an urgent task to devise a system to prevent this kind of problem 
from occurring.  The International Monetary Fund or the Bank for International Settlements 
are obvious institutions to be assigned to deal with such problems.  The alternative is to wait 
for the catastrophe to occur.  In that case consumers will subsequently be unwilling to invest 
in large banks in small countries.  In the meantime, however, very large costs will have been 
imposed on the global economy. 
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Table 1 
 
Typical “Haircut” or Initial Margin 
(in percent) 
                                                             January-May 2007                           April 2008 
U.S. treasuries 0.25 3 
Investment-grade bonds 0-3 8-12 
High-yield bonds 10-15 25-40 
Equities 15 20 
Investment grade CDS 1 5 
Synthetic super senior 1 2 
Senior leveraged loans 10-12 15-20 
2nd lien leveraged loans 15-20 25-35 
Mezzanine level loans 18-25 35+ 
ABS CDOs:   
AAA 2-4 15 
AA 4-7 20 
A 8-15 30-50 
BBB 10-20 40-70 
Equity 50 100 
AAA CLO 4 10-20 
AAA RMBS 2-4 10-20 
Alt-a MBS 3-5 20-50 
Sources: Citigroup; and IMF staff estimates – from International Monetary Fund (2008), 
Table 1.2, p. 23. 
 
Note: ABS = Asset-backed security; CDO = collateralized debt obligation; CDS = credit 
default swap: CLO = collateralized loan obligation; RMBS = residential mortgage-backed 
security 
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Figure 1 
Co-movement between AAA-rated US Structured Financial Instruments 
(in percent) 
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Source:  Bank of England calculations using data from JP Morgan Chase and Co. – Bank of 
England Financial Stability Report (2008, p. 24, Chart 1.19). 
 
Graph plots the proportion of the variation in exponentially weighted daily changes in credit 
default swap premia for the most senior tranche of the ABX HE 2006 H1.  CMBX NA Series 
1 and CDX NA explained by the first principal component over a three-month rolling 
window. 
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Figure 2 
 
Three-month Interbank Rates Relative to Expected Policy Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and Bank calculations – Bank of England (2008), Chart 10, p.11. 
 
Spread of three-month Libor to three-month overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Major Large Complex Financial Institutions Credit Default Swap Premia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Markit Group Limited, Thomson Datastream, published accounts and Bank 
calculations – Bank of England (2008), p. 11, Chart 9. 
 
 
 
 
